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Death Penalty Law
by Therese Michelle Day*
This Article provides a survey of death penalty case law in Georgia
from June 1, 2008 through May 31, 2009.1 The cases included in this
Survey were decided by the Georgia Supreme Court on interim appeal
and direct appeal,2 and in one instance, on denial of certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court. Discussion is limited to claims that
present new issues of law, refine existing law, or are otherwise
instructive.
I.

INTERIM REVIEW CASES

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed five cases 3 pursuant to interim
appellate review of death penalty cases under the Unified Appeal
Procedure.
In Fair v. State,4 Antron Dawayne Fair and Damon Antwon Jolly
were charged with the murder of a Bibb County deputy, Joseph
Whitehead; and the State filed notice of its intention to seek the death

* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public
Defender of Arizona. San Francisco State University (B.A., 1993); University of Arizona
College of Law (J.D., 2002). Member, State Bar of Georgia. The Author would like to note
that any comments in this Article are the views of the Author alone and should not be
attributed to any office or agency with which the Author is affiliated.
1. For analysis of Georgia death penalty law during the prior survey period, see
Therese M. Day, Death Penalty Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REv.

105 (2008).
2. Due to space restrictions, four state habeas cases have been omitted: Hall v.
McPherson, 284 Ga. 219,663 S.E.2d 659 (2008); Schofield v. Cook, 284 Ga. 240,663 S.E.2d
221 (2008); Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555,668 S.E.2d 651 (2008); and Hall v. Brannan,284
Ga. 716, 670 S.E.2d 87 (2008).
3.

Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 664 S.E.2d 211 (2008), and Reaves v. State, 284 Ga.

236, 664 S.E.2d 207 (2008), have been omitted because they are not instructive.
4. 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008). Fair's case number is S08A0426, and Jolly's is
S08A0427. Id.
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penalty.' The supreme court granted the defendants' applications for
interim review and directed the parties to address three issues.6
The court first addressed whether the trial court erred in denying the
defendants' pretrial motions requesting immunity from prosecution
pursuant to section 16-3-24.2 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.), 7 which provides: "A person who uses threats or force [in
defense of habitation or other personal or real property] shall be immune
from criminal prosecution ......
Jolly and Fair filed motions to dismiss
their indictments, arguing they were immune from prosecution pursuant
to this code section. After considering the matter during a pretrial
hearing, the trial court reserved its ruling until the conclusion of the
evidence at trial and prior to the jury charge. Fair and Jolly argued that
pursuant to the statute, the issue must be decided prior to trial. The
State conceded this issue and both parties filed motions to reconsider.
The trial court denied the motions.9
The supreme court noted that although the construction of O.C.G.A.
§ 16-3-24.2 was an issue of first impression, the issue of immunity from
prosecution had been correctly decided in Boggs v. State1 ° by the
Georgia Court of Appeals." In Boggs the court of appeals examined
the plain language of the statute and held that criminal proceedings are
barred against persons using force pursuant to the circumstances within
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23 and O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.12 The court of appeals also
determined that because O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 provides that "such
person[s] 'shall be immune from criminal prosecution,'" a trial court is
required to make immunity determinations prior to trial. 3 Deciding
that the issue had been correctly analyzed in Boggs, the supreme court
held that the trial court erred in refusing to make a pretrial determination of immunity from prosecution. 4
16
The court next addressed whether, under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8),
the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motions to have the jury

5. Id. at 165, 664 S.E.2d at 229-30.
6. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 230.
7. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 (2007).
8. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23 (2007) (authorizing the use of force in defense of
habitation); O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24 (2007) (authorizing the use of force in defense of property
other than habitation).
9. Fair,284 Ga. at 165, 664 S.E.2d at 230.
10. 261 Ga. App. 104, 581 S.E.2d 722 (2003).
11. Fair,284 Ga. at 166, 664 S.E.2d at 230.
12. Boggs, 261 Ga. App. at 106, 581 S.E.2d at 723; see also supra note 8.
13.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2).

14. Fair,284 Ga. at 166, 664 S.E.2d at 230.
15. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8) (2008).

2009]

DEATH PENALTY LAW

charged regarding an alleged scienter element within one of the
statutory aggravating circumstances. 16 This statute provides for an
aggravating circumstance when "[tihe offense of murder was committed
against any peace officer, corrections employee, or firefighter while
engaged in the performance of his official duties." 7
The supreme court noted that both Fair and Jolly were indicted on one
count of malice murder and three counts of felony murder, predicated on,
inter alia, the felony of aggravated assault.18 The court directed the
parties to address whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the
victim-status scienter instruction during the sentencing phase of the
trial. 9 However, Fair and Jolly made an additional argument. They
argued that the State had to prove, during the merits phase of the trial
and beyond a reasonable doubt, that they knew the victim was a police
officer engaged in the performance of his duties at the time they shot
him. Fair and Jolly's argument stemmed from the indictment, which
included the victim's name and his title as a police officer.2 ° Fair and
Jolly made this argument even though they conceded the predicate
offense for felony murder was aggravated assault pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 16-5-21(a)2 1 and not aggravated assault upon a peace officer pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c).22 The court relied upon established law distinguishing between material and non-material information within an
indictment, reasoning that "[tihe identification of the victim as a law
enforcement officer by appending 'Bibb County Sheriff's Deputy' to his
name describes neither the offenses charged nor the manner in which
they were committed."" Therefore, the court held that the trial court
properly denied the accused's motions requesting a jury instruction on
scienter during the merits phase of the trial.24
The court next addressed whether the O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8)
aggravating circumstance required the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Fair and Jolly knew the victim was a peace officer
engaged in his official duties.' Fair and Jolly argued that a scienter
element is implicit in the statute despite the fact that the statute is
silent regarding the accused's knowledge of the officer's status. The

16.
17.
18.
19.

Fair,284 Ga. at 165, 664 S.E.2d at 230.
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(bX8).
Fair,284 Ga. at 166, 664 S.E.2d at 230.
Id. at 167, 664 S.E.2d at 231.

20. Id.
21. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) (2007).
22. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c) (2007); Fair,284 Ga. at 167-68, 664 S.E.2d at 231.

23. Fair,284 Ga. at 167, 664 S.E.2d at 231.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing O.C.GA. § 17-10-30(b)(8)).

102

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

State countered, arguing that because the statute fails to include the
word knowingly, there should be no requirement that the defendants
knew the victim was a peace officer.2" The court noted that the matter
was an issue of statutory construction, which required the court "to
glean the intent of the legislature."27
The court acknowledged that the word knowingly is included in the
criminal statute defining aggravated assault against a peace officer as
well as in the criminal statute defining aggravated battery against a
peace officer." Furthermore, both crimes have been construed by the
state appellate courts to require a scienter element including the victim's
status as a police officer.29 The court also emphasized the significance
of the fact that the Georgia General Assembly adopted these statutes
subsequent to the adoption of the revised death penalty statute, which
included the O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8) aggravating circumstance without
a knowledge requirement.3 ° Moreover, the court noted that the
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(3) 3' aggravating circumstance, which was
enacted simultaneously with O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8), 2 has a scienter
requirement.33 The court reasoned that the statutory history indicated
the General Assembly knew how to apply the scienter element, and the
court concluded that it "'must presume that its failure to do so was a
matter of considered choice.' 34 The court also recognized the distinction between a crime resulting in injury and a crime resulting in death
and reasoned that it was "logical to conclude that the General Assembly
purposely made such a distinction."3M The court noted that in cases like
36
the present one, "'the offender takes his victim as he finds him.'"
Accordingly, the court held that the O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8) statutory
aggravating circumstance does not require the defendant to know "that
the victim was a peace officer or other designated official engaged in the

26. Id. at 168, 664 S.E.2d at 231.
27. Id. at 167-68, 664 S.E.2d at 231.
28. Id. at 168, 664 S.E.2d at 231 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(c), -24(c)).
29. Id.
30. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 232 (citing 1973 Ga. Laws 159, 163-65).
31. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(bX3) (2008).
32. See 1973 Ga. Laws at 164-65.
33. Fair, 284 Ga. at 168, 664 S.E.2d at 232. There is an aggravating circumstance
under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(3) when "Ithe offender, by his act of murder, armed robbery,
or kidnapping, knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public
place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of
more than one person." O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(3) (emphasis added).
34. Fair,284 Ga. at 168, 664 S.E.2d at 232 (quoting Inland Paperboard & Packaging,
Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 274 Ga. App. 101, 104, 616 S.E.2d 873, 876 (2005)).
35. Id. at 169, 664 S.E.2d at 232.
36. Id. (quoting United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 685 (1975)).
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performance of his duties."37 Therefore, the supreme court held that
the trial court did not err when it denied the defendants' requests for a
jury instruction on scienter during the penalty phase of the trial.3"
The final issue the court reviewed related solely to Fair and addressed
whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
evidence.3 9 The evidence produced at trial was the product of a noknock search warrant that authorized a search "for evidence of the crime
of Violation of Georgia Controlled Substance[s] Act."40 Fair first
contended that the warrant was void for failing "to state with sufficient
particularity the things to be seized." 1 The court stated that for a
warrant to be valid, it must provide a description of items that "is
sufficient to enable a prudent officer executing the warrant to locate it
definitely and with reasonable certainty."42 The court noted that "'the
degree of the description's specificity is flexible and will vary with the
circumstances involved.' 43 Moreover, the court reasoned that "several
jurisdictions have held that [miore specificity is not required by the
Constitution where items to be seized [are] limited to those relating to
the smuggling, packing, distribution and use of controlled substances."
Accordingly, the court held that the evidence to be seized in
Fair's case was "sufficiently described" such that the officers could locate
the evidence "'definitely and with reasonable certainty. '
Fair next argued that the warrant lacked probable cause because the
warrant's affidavit relied upon information from a concerned citizen as
well as two sources that were of questionable reliability and veracity.4"
The court noted that although the trial court disregarded the information from Source Two as unreliable and stale, the information provided
by the concerned citizen and Source One "still provided the magistrate
with a substantial basis for finding probable cause."4 7 The court

37. Id. at 170, 664 S.E.2d at 233.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 171, 664 S.E.2d at 233.
40. Id. at 170, 664 S.E.2d at 233 (alteration in original) (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Georgia Controlled Substances Act can be found at
O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-20 to -56 (2007 & Supp. 2009).
41. Fair,284 Ga. at 170, 664 S.E.2d at 233.
42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291, 294,
519 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1999)).
43. Id. (quoting Dobbins v. State, 262 Ga. 161, 164, 415 S.E.2d 168, 171 (1992)).
44. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
States v. Ladd, 704 F.2d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 1983)).
45. Id. at 171, 664 S.E.2d at 233 (quoting Bishop, 271 Ga. at 294, 519 S.E.2d at 209).
46. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 233-34. The two challenged sources in the affidavit were
confidential informants designated as "Source One" and "Source Two." Id.
47. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 234.
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reasoned that Source One "kn[ew] what [miarijuana look[edl like and
how it is packaged for sale,' had in the preceding [seventy-two] hours
been on the premises at 3135 Atherton Street[,] and had witnessed at
least two individuals therein package marijuana for distribution."'
Moreover, the court noted that Deputy Whitehead averred in the
warrant that "he had known Source [Olne for approximately three years
and that he or she had provided information leading to drug seizures
and approximately ten felony arrests." 9 The court, therefore, held that
this was sufficient to establish Source One's reliability and veracity.50
Although the court rejected the validity of the information from the
concerned citizen because it was conclusory and unverified by Deputy
Whitehead, it nonetheless held that the warrant affidavit provided "a
substantial basis for concluding that a fair probability existed that
evidence of a crime would be found at the premises."5 ' The court also
denied Fair's remaining challenges to the warrant and, accordingly,
affirmed the trial court's judgment in part, reversed it in part, and
remanded it with direction in both cases.52
In Martin v. State,' DeKelvin Rafael Martin was indicted for, inter
alia, the murders of his girlfriend's grandparents and twelve year old son
and the rape of his girlfriend, Tymika Wright. The State filed notice of
its intention to seek the death penalty. The supreme court granted
Martin's application for interim review and ordered the parties to
address the sole issue of whether it was error for the trial court to deny
Martin's motion in limine to preclude admission of the surviving victim's
pretrial testimony when the victim was unavailable for trial due to her
subsequent death.'
Martin pleaded guilty to all counts in his indictment on January 4,
2005, and sentencing was held before the trial court rather than a jury.
During the penalty phase, Wright testified for the State. In December
2006, following his conviction and sentence, Martin was permitted to
withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court had failed to inform him
of all of his constitutional rights.'
Prior to his new trial, Martin

48. Id. at 172, 664 S.E.2d at 234 (first and third alterations in orginal) (quoting
affidavit).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing State v. Hunter, 282 Ga. 278, 280, 646 S.E.2d 465, 467 (2007)).
52. Id. at 172-78, 664 S.E.2d at 234-37.
53. 284 Ga. 504, 668 S.E.2d 685 (2008).
54. Id. at 504-05, 668 S.E.2d at 686-87.
55. Id. at 505, 668 S.E.2d at 687. The court noted that the applicable constitutional
rights are set out in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). Martin, 284 Ga. at 505,
668 S.E.2d at 687.
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moved to prevent the admission of Wright's testimony from the merits
phase of his first trial.' The trial court denied his motion and held
that Wright's testimony was admissible pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-3107 and would not violate the Confrontation Clause s under Crawford
v. Washington.59
The supreme court first noted that the admissibility of this testimony
was a matter of both state evidentiary law and federal constitutional
law, and "'[in keeping with the well-established principle that this
Court will not decide a constitutional question if the appeal can be
decided upon other grounds, we first address the [evidentiary] issue[]
raised by the appeal. ' " ° The court then addressed the admissibility of
this testimony pursuant to Georgia statutory law."1 The court determined that there are three requirements for the admission of prior
testimony: "'(1) the declarant is unavailable as a witness at trial; (2) the
testimony was given under oath at a hearing or other proceeding; and
(3) the parties and issues are substantially similar."'6 2
Although Martin conceded that the three requirements were met, he
argued that because the issues at the penalty phase of his first trial
"were not substantially similar" to the issues that would be presented at
the merits phase of his new trial, the scope of the testimony at the first
trial "did not provide him with an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
Ms. Wright."'
Martin analogized his case to cases holding that

56. Martin, 284 Ga. at 505, 668 S.E.2d at 687.
57. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-10 (1995). This statute provides:
The testimony of a witness since deceased ... for any cause which was given
under oath on a former trial upon substantially the same issue and between
substantially the same parties may be proved by anyone who heard it and who
professes to remember the substance of the entire testimony as to the particular
matter about which he testifies.
Id.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
59. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Martin, 284 Ga. at 505, 668 S.E.2d at
687.
60. Martin, 284 Ga. at 505, 668 S.E.2d at 687 (alterations in original) (quoting Powell
v. State, 270 Ga. 327, 327-28, 510 S.E.2d 18, 20 (1998)).
61. See id.
62. Id. (quoting Pope v. Fields, 273 Ga. 6,.7-8, 536 S.E.2d 740, 742 (2000)). These
three requirements constitute the "prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
(citing O.C.G.A. § 24-3-10).
63. Id. at 505-06, 668 S.E.2d at 687. The court noted that substantially,as defined
under the statute, meant "something less than 'identical.'" Id. at 506, 668 S.E.2d at 687
(quoting Atlanta & W. Point R.R. v. Venable, 67 Ga. 697, 699 (1881)). However, it also
noted that "there must be 'sufficient similarity so that there was previously an adequate
opportunity for cross examination.'" Id., 668 S.E.2d at 687-68 (quoting Prater v. State, 148
Ga. App. 831, 837, 253 S.E.2d 223, 228 (1979)); see also Craft v. State, 154 Ga. App. 682,
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testimony given at a bond hearing was inadmissible at trial because
"'the issues involved in the two proceedings were not so sufficiently
similar that it can be said that the previous opportunity for crossexamination of the witness ...

was adequate.'"'

Martin argued that

because the penalty phase of the first trial focused solely on the sentence
he would receive and because Wright's testimony related to "the impact
the crime ...

had on her life,'

Martin "had no reason to cross-

examine Ms. Wright regarding issues of his culpability or Ms. Wright's
credibility, because his guilt was not at issue.'
The court rejected Martin's argument, noting that "evidence relating
to guilt or innocence is relevant to sentence and, thus, admissible, in a
sentencing trial . . . 'because the [fact finder] needs to examine the
circumstances of the offense[s] ...

in order to decide ...

punish-

ment."' 7 The court further noted that despite Martin's guilty plea, the
State was still required to prove the existence of a statutory aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death could
be considered.'
The court reasoned that several of the alleged
statutory circumstances were also the offenses for which Martin was
charged; therefore, the State was required to prove that the offenses
were committed in the commission of the murders and rape of the
victims.69 Moreover, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder of Wright's son "involved torture, depravity
of mind, or an aggravated battery to him," and that Martin committed
an aggravated battery against Wright's grandmother, a crime to which
Martin did not plead guilty.7"
The court decided that Wright's testimony at the penalty phase of the
first trial helped the State demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of the alleged statutory aggravating circumstances because "it
included Ms. Wright's account of Martin's alleged commission of her own

269 S.E.2d 490 (1980).
64. Martin, 284 Ga. at 507,668 S.E.2d at 688 (alteration in original) (quoting Craft, 154
Ga. App. at 683, 269 S.E.2d at 492); see also Dickson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 539, 540, 636
S.E.2d 721, 723 (2006).
65. Martin,284 Ga. at 507,668 S.E.2d at 688 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 507-08, 668 S.E.2d at 688 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206, 210, 327 S.E.2d 168, 173 (1985)); see also Romine v. State,

256 Ga. 521, 528, 350 S.E.2d 446, 453 (1986); Blankenship v. State, 251 Ga. 621, 624, 308
S.E.2d 369, 371 (1983).
68. Martin, 284 Ga. at 508, 668 S.E.2d at 688-89.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing O.C.G.A- § 17-10-30(b)(2), (b)(7), (c) (2008)); see also Romine, 256 Ga. at
528, 350 S.E.2d at 453.
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rape, the murders of her son and her grandfather, and the aggravated
battery of her grandmother that ultimately resulted in a third murder
charge against Martin for her death."71 The court also determined that
Martin was not restricted in the manner in which he cross-examined
Wright during the first trial.72 Therefore, the court concluded that the
testimony during the penalty phase of the first trial, which helped the
State establish the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt, was "substantially the same... as the issue
of ultimate proof of guilt ...

[which] provided Martin a meaningful

opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Wright." 73 Accordingly, the supreme
court held that the trial court did not err when it denied Martin's motion
in limine. 4
II. DIRECT APPEAL CASES
The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed only one case pursuant to the
automatic review procedure in Georgia's death penalty
statute,7 5
76

following conviction and imposition of the death penalty.

In O'Kelley v. State,77 Dorian Frank O'Kelley was convicted by a jury
of two counts of malice murder and two counts of first degree arson,
among other crimes, and was sentenced to death.7' The supreme court
first determined that the trial court erred by failing to merge the two
first-degree arson counts at sentencing. 79 The court noted that

71. Martin, 284 Ga. at 509, 668 S.E.2d at 689.
72. Id.
73. Id., 668 S.E.2d at 689-90 (citing Prater, 148 Ga. App. at 831, 837, 253 S.E.2d at
223, 228).

74. Id., 668 S.E.2d at 690. The court also noted, "[Wie express no opinion on whether
portions of Ms. Wright's prior testimony might be subject to any other form of objection."
Id.
75. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35 (2008).

76. The court also addressed a funding issue related to death penalty cases in Georgia
Public Defender StandardsCouncil v. State, 285 Ga. 169, 675 S.E.2d 25 (2009), holding
that the council was responsible for paying indigent defense costs pursuant to former
O.C.G.A. § 17-12-127(b) (2004) (repealed 2008), in a case that was indicted prior to January
1, 2005, the date on which the Office of the Georgia Capital Defender was established. Ga.
Pub. Defender StandardsCouncil, 285 Ga. at 170, 172-73,675 S.E.2d at 26, 28. The court
reasoned that the statute did not expressly exclude reimbursement by the council for
defendants indicted prior to the creation of the Office of the Georgia Capital Defender,
when counsel had been appointed after January 1, 2005, especially when the statute
explicitly provided for payment of counsel with council funds. Id. at 172-73, 675 S.E.2d
at 27-28.
77. 284 Ga. 758, 670 S.E.2d 388 (2008).
78. Id. at 758, 670 S.E.2d at 391.
79. Id. at 760, 670 S.E.2d at 393.
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although O'Kelley and his co-defendant, Daryl Stinski," set multiple
fires within the victim's residence, OKelley's actions constituted one act
of arson because only one house was burned."' The supreme court,
therefore, directed the trial court to strike the sentence as to one count
of arson."
The court next addressed a number of claims related to the improper
qualification of prospective jurors.'
OKelley argued that the trial
court erroneously qualified six prospective jurors whose views regarding4
the death penalty should have prevented them from serving as jurors.8
The court noted that the proper standard in reviewing such claims "is
whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions
and his oath."8M
On review of the issue of whether prospective juror Hopkins was
improperly qualified to serve, the court determined that his leanings
toward imposing the death penalty or life without the possibility of
parole did not disqualify him when he stated on voir dire that "[als an
open-minded adult, he could reasonably consider ...

life with the

possibility of parole ... and all three sentencing options.'
The court,
likewise, determined there was no error in qualifying prospective juror
Carter despite Carter having "expressed support for the death penalty
during his successful campaign for election as a state representative and
because he stated on his juror questionnaire that 'if [O'Kelley] is guilty,
he should get the death sentence.'""7 The court noted that despite
Carter explaining that he had no hesitation about imposing a death
sentence in a case in which there was overwhelming evidence of guilt,
"Mr. Carter repeatedly indicated that he would consider all three
sentencing options, and he specifically stated that he could consider a

80. For a discussion of Stinski's case, see Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1
(2007).
81. OKelley, 284 Ga. at 760-61, 670 S.E.2d at 393.

82. Id. at 761,670 S.E.2d at 393. The trial court erroneously sentenced OKelley to two
consecutive twenty-year sentences for the two arson counts. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217, 222,
526 S.E.2d 560, 566 (2000)). In Nance the supreme court held that "the relevant inquiry
is whether the trial court's qualification of the prospective juror is supported by the record
as a whole." 272 Ga. at 222, 526 S.E.2d at 566. The court also held that reviewing courts
are required to defer to "the trial court's resolution of any equivocations or conflicts in the
prospective juror's responses on voir dire." Id. at 222, 526 S.E.2d at 566-67.
86. OKelley, 284 Ga. at 761,670 S.E.2d at 393-94 (first alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 761-62, 670 S.E.2d at 394 (alteration in original).
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sentence of life with the possibility of parole where an intentional
murder with aggravating circumstances was found. "s'
Further,
although Carter "acknowledged that he would want his constituents to
know that he favored the death penalty or a life without parole sentence
and that he 'care[d] very much about public service and ... [his]
political career,'"8 he
nonetheless stated he "'would sacrifice that to do
9
the right thing.'"
The court next considered the trial court's qualification of prospective
juror Biskup, who was the fifty-eighth qualified juror." The court
noted that the trial court qualified sixty prospective jurors despite the
fact that it had determined that a panel of fifty-four jurors was needed
for selection of the jury and four alternates. 9 Thus, the court concluded that any alleged error regarding jurors numbered fifty-five or higher
would be harmless because "even if both sides used all their allotted
strikes, it would be impossible for those jurors to be reached during the
selection of either the jury or the alternate jurors."92
The court next considered the qualification of prospective jurors
Martin, Gnann, and Lanier. 3 The court noted that Gnann and Lanier
"were initially somewhat confused about the bifurcated trial procedure,
the three sentencing options, and the consideration of mitigating
evidence."9' However, once these issues were clarified, "they stated
repeatedly that they could listen to the evidence and consider all three
sentencing options." 5 Therefore, the supreme court held that the trial
court "did not err by qualifying these jurors."'
Similarly, the court
held that Martin was qualified despite expressing "her personal feeling
against the sentence of life with the possibility of parole" when she also
stated that she would "probably consider all three [sentencing] possibili-

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 762, 670 S.E.2d at 394.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
Id.

92. Id. The court noted that it could not determine whether the jurors were called in
the order set by the jury clerk because the trial court allowed the parties to strike the jury
silently. Id. at 763, 670 S.E.2d at 394. The court cautioned trial courts to follow the
Unified Appeal Procedure, which requires that all proceedings in death penalty cases be
transcribed. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 394-95; see also GA. R. UNIFIED APP. P. note, available at
http'/www.gasupreme.us/rules/rules-uap/.

93. O'Kelley, 284 Ga. at 763, 670 S.E.2d at 395. The court noted that although these
three jurors would not be selected for the panel based on their juror numbers, they could
have been selected as alternates; therefore, any error would not necessarily be harmless.
Id.
94. Id. at 764, 670 S.E.2d at 395.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
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ties" as well as "any mitigating evidence offered in making the determination on sentencing."97
The court also rejected O'Kelley's claim that the trial court improperly
rehabilitated prospective jurors by asking general questions related to
"whether a juror would follow the law."" The court determined that
the trial court's questions were not the kind of "general fairness and
follow the law questions"" disapproved in Morgan v. Illinois,"° but
were, instead, "targeted questions... [that] aided the court in resolving
the equivocations and conflicts in their responses." °1 The court,
therefore, determined this claim had no merit." 2
The court next addressed whether it was error for the trial court to
deny OKelley's request to make an opening statement prior to his
presentation of evidence at the penalty phase of his trial.0

3

The court

noted that the trial court initially granted O'Kelley's request; however,
upon the State's objection that O'Kelley was not entitled to make an
opening statement because the State had opted not to make one itself,
the trial court denied O'Kelley's request."° Although the supreme
court initially observed that "[o]pening statements in the sentencing
phase of a death penalty trial are not specifically required by 'statute,
rule or caselaw,'" the court recognized that it had noted "on more than
one occasion that .

.

. 'it is the better practice to allow the parties to

outline for the jury their expected evidence in aggravation or mitigation.'" 5 The court emphasized that
in recognition of the importance of opening statements to the trial
process, this Court has promulgated a rule entitled, "Opening Statements in Criminal Matters." That rule provides that "[d]efense counsel

may make an opening statement immediately after the state's opening
statement and prior to introduction of evidence, or following the
conclusion of the state's presentation of evidence." 6

97. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 395-96. O'Kelley referred to the trial court's questions as
"talismanic" rehabilitation. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 396.
99. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 734 (1992)).
100. 504 U.S. 719, 734-35 (1992).
101. O'Kelley, 284 Ga. at 764-65, 670 S.E.2d at 396.
102. Id. at 765, 670 S.E.2d at 396.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 240, 250, 510 S.E.2d 1, 11 (1998)); see also
Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811, 818, 525 S.E.2d 339, 347 (1999).
106. O'Kelley, 284 Ga. at 765-66,670 S.E.2d at 396 (alteration in original) (quoting GA.
UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 10.2).
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The court reasoned that "[tihe primary rationale for the opening
statement is 'to inform the jury in a general way of the nature of the
action and defense so that they may better be prepared to understand
the evidence.' 10 7 Accordingly, the court held that the same rationale
applies during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial.0 8 The
court noted that the two phases of a capital murder trial address very
different issues and that the bifurcated trial procedure "was created to
withhold matters inadmissible on the issue of guilt or innocence from the
jury until that issue ha[s] been determined."" 9 Therefore, an opening
statement at the merits phase of the trial would not necessarily address
the issues and evidence to be presented during the penalty phase.' °
Moreover, the court reasoned, "Without the opportunity to make an
opening statement at the sentencing phase, a defendant is left without
the means to provide a roadmap to guide the jurors during the
presentation of his mitigating evidence.""'
Continuing, the court
noted, "This is not an insignificant deprivation, given the complexity of
many mitigation defenses and the fact that, in many death penalty
trials, the defendant's focus is not so much on his guilt or innocence as
it is on why a death sentence should not be imposed on him."1 '2
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court erred when it refused
O'Kelley's request to make an opening statement prior to presenting his
evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. ' 3 However, the court
decided that the error was harmless because O'Kelley's actual mitigation
themes were "straightforward" and not complex. ' Moreover, O'Kelley's proposed opening statement, which was presented to the court at
his motion for a new trial hearing, consisted of "a single paragraph
actually addressing the evidence to be presented."" 5
The court summarily rejected OKelley's remaining claim challenging
Georgia's lethal injection protocol, holding that O'Kelley failed to present
any evidence that had not already been considered by the court.1 6

107. Id. at 766, 670 S.E.2d at 396 (quoting Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411,
415 (1934)); see also Sims v. State, 251 Ga. 877, 879, 311 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1984).
108. O'Kelley, 284 Ga. at 766, 670 S.E.2d at 397.
109. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v.
State, 236 Ga. 12, 20, 222 S.E.2d 308, 315 (1976)); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
190-92 (1976).
110. O'Kelley, 284 Ga. at 766-67, 670 S.E.2d at 397.
111. Id. at 767, 670 S.E.2d at 398.
112. Id. at 767-78, 670 S.E.2d at 398.
113. Id. at 768, 670 S.E.2d at 398.
114. Id. at 769, 670 S.E.2d at 398.
115. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 398-99.
116. Id. at 770, 670 S.E.2d at 399.
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Moreover, the court concluded that O'Kelley failed to demonstrate that
Georgia's lethal injection protocol created "'a substantial risk of seriouss
The court also conducted the required statutory review11
harm. ' '
and held that (1) O'Kelley's death sentence did not result from passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2) "the evidence was clearly
sufficient to authorize the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of the statutory aggravating circumstances"; and (3) his
sentence of death was "not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases."119 Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower
court's judgment. 2 °
III. DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari' 2 ' from the
Georgia Supreme Court case of Walker v. State.22 is included in this
Survey because the "[s]tatement... respecting the denial" of certiorari,
signed by Justice Stevens, provides thoughtful analysis regarding
proportionality review of capital cases in Georgia. 123 Justice Stevens
brings clarity to the issue, especially in light of the Georgia Supreme
the United
Court's treatment of proportionality review 24 following
25
States Supreme Court's opinion in Pulley V.Harris.
In Walker v. Georgia,'2 6 Artemus Rick Walker petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.' 27 The question presented was whether Georgia's capital sentencing scheme violates the Eighth

117. Id. (quoting Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008)).
118. See O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c).
119. O'Kelley, 284 Ga. at 770, 670 S.E.2d at 399 (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(2)-(3);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)).
120. Id. at 771, 670 S.E.2d at 400.
121. Walker v. Georgia, 129 S. Ct. 453 (2008) (mem.) (Stevens, J., statement respecting
denial of cert.).
122. 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007).
123. Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 453.
124. See id. at 456-57.
125. 465 U.S. 37 (1984). In Pulley the Court addressed the constitutionality of
California's capital scheme, which did not include proportionality review. Id. at 41, 53.
The Court held that proportionality review was not required for California's death penalty
statute to be constitutionally compliant. Id. at 54. However, this is not to say that
proportionality review is never required. As the Court noted in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862 (1983), "Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence of an important
procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death sentence by the
Georgia Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality." Id. at 890.
126. 129 S. Ct. 453 (2008) (mem.) (Stevens, J., statement respecting denial of cert.).
127. Id. at 453.
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Amendment's1 " guarantee against arbitrary and discriminatory
sentences.'" Walker specifically alleged that the Georgia Supreme
Court "'fail[ed] to: (1) conduct meaningful proportionality review, and (2)
enforce reporting requirements under Georgia's capital sentencing
scheme.' 13 The Court denied Walker's petition because he failed to
raise these claims in state court. 3 ' Justice Stevens wrote a statement
with respect to the denial of Walker's petition "to emphasize that the
Court's denial has no precedential effect... and to note that petitioner's
submission is supported by our prior opinions evaluating the constitutionality of the Georgia statute."132
Justice Stevens initially noted that in Furman v. Georgia,33 Justice
Stewart "observed that death sentences imposed pursuant to Georgia's
capital sentencing scheme were 'cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.'"' 3 At the time of
Furman,the Georgia statute provided juries with absolute discretion in
sentencing, which resulted "in the arbitrary, and often discriminatory,
issuance of capital sentences."1" Justice Stevens noted that following
Furman,the Georgia General Assembly amended its capital sentencing
scheme to include new procedural protections against the imposition of
arbitrary death sentences. 13
One of these statutory protections
required the Georgia Supreme Court to "'compar[e] each death sentence
with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure
that the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate.'"'137 Justice Stevens noted, "We assumed that the court would
consider whether there were similarly situated defendants who had not
been put to death because that inquiry is an essential part of any
" 138
meaningful proportionality review.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII.
Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 453.
Id. at 453-54 (alteration in original) (quoting petition for cert.).
Id. at 454.
Id.
408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justice Stevens credits Justice Stewart with being the
"principal architect of [the Court's] death penalty jurisprudence." Walker, 129 S. Ct. at
454.
134. Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 454 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J.,
concurring)). In Furman Justice Stewart concluded that "the Eighth ... Amendment[]
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed." 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).

135. Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 454.
136. Id.
137. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976)).
138. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Justice Stevens observed that the Court's assumptions were confirmed
in Zant v. Stephens 139 when the Court considered "whether a death
sentence was valid notwithstanding the jury's reliance on an invalid
aggravating circumstance." 140 Justice Stevens determined that the
decision to uphold the sentence in Zant "'depend[ed] in part on the
existence of an important procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate
review of each death sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court to avoid
arbitrariness and to assure proportionality.' 14' Justice Stevens found
it to be particularly important that the Georgia Supreme Court
"expressly stated that its proportionality review 'uses for comparison
purposes not only similar cases in which death was imposed, but similar
cases in which death was not imposed."'"42 Justice Stevens reasoned
that this was a judicious approach given that cases in which a death
relevant
sentence was not imposed "might well provide the most
143
evidence of arbitrariness in the sentence before the court."
Justice Stevens also expressed his concern about the "risk of arbitrari44
ness in cases that involve black defendants and white victims."

Noting there is "some indication that those risks have diminished over
time," Justice Stevens concluded that "the race-of-victim effect persists."4 ' Justice Stevens was particularly troubled by the fact that
this case involved an African-American defendant and a white victim.1 46 Justice Stevens noted that following Walker's conviction and

sentence of death, the Georgia Supreme Court performed "an utterly
perfunctory review" rather than "a thorough proportionality review to
mitigate the heightened risks of arbitrariness and discrimination in this
case." 47 For instance, Justice Stevens noted that the Georgia Supreme Court's proportionality review in Walker was limited to "a single
paragraph" consisting of "a string citation of [twenty-one] cases in which
the jury imposed a death sentence[,] .

.

. mak[ing] no reference to the

facts of those cases or to the aggravating circumstances found by the
jury."148

Moreover, Justice Stevens emphasized that "[hiad the Georgia
Supreme Court looked outside the universe of cases in which the jury

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

462 U.S. 862 (1983).
Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 454.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 890).
Id. (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 880 n.19).
Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 455.
Id.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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imposed a death sentence, it would have found numerous cases involving
offenses very similar to petitioner's in which the jury imposed a sentence
of life imprisonment."4 9 Further, Justice Stevens noted that in a
number 150
of other similar cases, the State did not even seek the death
penalty.
Justice Stevens observed that the Georgia Supreme Court's practice
of limiting proportionality review began after the Court decided Pulley
v. Harris,5 ' in which the Court held that "the Eighth Amendment does
not require comparative proportionality review of every capital
sentence."'52 Justice Stevens clarified the Court's position in Pulley,
stating, that its "assertion was intended to convey our recognition of
differences among the States' capital schemes and the fact that we
consider statutes as we find them .... [Ilt was not meant to undermine
our conclusion in Gregg and Zant that such review is an important
component of the Georgia scheme."'5 3 Justice Stevens concluded, "The
Georgia Supreme Court owes its capital litigants... [a] duty of care and
must take seriously its obligation to safeguard against the imposition of
death sentences that are arbitrary or infected by impermissible
considerations such as race."'5 4

149. Id. at 455-56 (citing Jones v. State, 279 Ga. 854, 622 S.E.2d 1 (2005); Spickler v.
State, 276 Ga. 164, 575 S.E.2d 482 (2003); Cross v. State, 271 Ga. 427, 520 S.E.2d 457
(1999); Jenkins v. State, 268 Ga. 468, 491 S.E.2d 54 (1997); LeMay v. State, 265 Ga. 73,
453 S.E.2d 737 (1995); Cobb v. State, 250 Ga. 1, 295 S.E.2d 319 (1982)).
150. Id. at 456 (citing Davis v. State, 281 Ga. 871, 644 S.E.2d 113 (2007); Wiggins v.
State, 280 Ga. 627, 632 S.E.2d 80 (2006); Escobar v. State, 279 Ga. 727, 620 S.E.2d 812
(2005); Stanley v. State, 261 Ga. 412, 405 S.E.2d 493 (1991)).
151. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
152. Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 456 (citing Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44--46).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 457.

